What Goes Around Comes Around

In 2005, the U.S. Senate went through a crisis of sorts: the Republicans, under Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, expressed frustration that some of President Bush’s nominees to Federal Court judgeship positions were being filibustered by the Democrats. Although this handful of nominees only represented a tiny fraction of the “Bush” judges that the Democrats actually helped to confirm (and previously, the Republicans had blocked a much larger number of President Clinton’s nominees), the GOP wanted ALL of them confirmed. To get their way, Majority Leader Frist threatened to manipulate Senate rules and adopt what came to be known as the “Nuclear Option” for confirming presidential nominees. With it in place, it would take a simple majority vote on the Senate floor, instead of the sixty-vote supermajority, to end debate and send the confirmation vote for any nominee to the Senate floor for a final up-down vote. Just before it looked as if Frist was going to take this “Nuclear Option”, fourteen Senate colleagues (split evenly between the two parties), dubbed the “Gang of Fourteen”, agreed among themselves to (1) reject the Nuclear Option and (2) agree on their own to send all nominees to final confirmation vote unless there was something extraordinarily astray with the candidate. So by this, the Nuclear Option was averted and, as such, it was regarded as a big defeat for Frist (even though all of the nominees in question ended up being confirmed). But I thought back then and still do even more so, that Frist was foolish to suggest the Nuclear Option in the first place.

If the Nuclear Option had been enacted, then the Republicans stood to gain, as I had stated before, a small handful of confirmations. It may be argued that it was for the upcoming vacancies in the U.S. Supreme Court that this whole controversy swirled around. But in that case, the political pressure would have been very heavily in favor of forcing the Democrats to allow a floor confirmation vote (and then rejecting the candidate) if the individual selected to fill the vacancy seemed too objectionable. On the other hand, had the Nuclear Option been enacted, it would have given the Democrats the benefit of having it should they gain the Presidency and maintain control of the Senate (both very viable possibilities at the present). There are several sitting Supreme Court justices who may just be waiting for the outcome of the 2008 election before deciding to retire. Should Obama win, justices like John Paul Stevens, David Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsberg may all opt for retirement (Stevens will probably retire anyway). Then the new Democratic President’s choices for their replacements would come under Senate scrutiny. And because of the flack raised by Frist and his colleagues demanding floor votes for every nominee, it will be that much more difficult to block any Obama pick. Of course, if the Nuclear Option had been enacted, it would have been next to impossible! It’s funny how political parties in power tend to act with such expediency, never seeming to understand that sooner or later their run as the “big shots” will end and the opposing party will be calling the shots. And enjoying the advantage of whatever new rules the previous “rulers” had passed for their own advantage. What goes around comes around! And, supposing a Democratic Senate Majority Leader under a future Democratic president gets frustrated with Republican filibusters of his/her nominees, the Democrats could turn the table and pull the very same Nuclear Option that Frist paved the way for.